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ABSTRACT:  I examine how Meillassoux’s conception of correlationism in After Finitude, 
as I understand it, relates firstly to Kant’s transcendental idealist philosophy, and secondly 
to the analytic Kantianism of Wilfrid Sellars. I argue that central to the views of both Kant 
and Sellars is what might be called, with an ambivalent nod to Meillassoux, an objective 
correlationism.  What emerges in the end as the recommended upshot of these analyses is a 
naturalistic Kantianism that takes the form of an empirical realism in roughly Kant’s sense, 
but one that is happily wed with Sellars’ scientific realism, once the latter is disentangled 
from two implausible commitments that made such a reconciliation seem impossible to 
Sellars himself. 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
1. At the outset of his 2008 talk on “Time Without Becoming,” Quentin Meillassoux 
describes his key concept of correlationism, a concept which he had expounded in his influential 
2006 book, Après la finitude, published in English in 2008 as After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency, in the following way.  “I call ‘correlationism’ the contemporary opponent of any 
realism,” and he indicates that he particularly has in mind certain views shared by “transcendental 
philosophy, the varieties of phenomenology, and post-modernism”: namely, as he puts it, the idea 
“that there are no objects, no events, no laws, no beings which are not always already correlated 
with a point of view, with a subjective access” (Meillassoux 2014: 9).  Transcendental (as opposed 
to post-modern) correlationism, in particular, is the view that “there are some universal forms of 
the subjective knowledge of things” (ibid. 10).  “The realist, by contrast, maintains “that is possible 
to attain something like a reality in itself, existing absolutely independently of his viewpoint, or his 
categories, or his culture, or his language, etc.” (ibid. 9).   
 
 Meillassoux is here painting in very broad strokes, but in his more detailed realist 
arguments against “the basic argument of these ‘philosophies of access’” he has been concerned 
to stress “the exceptional strength of its antirealist argumentation” (ibid. 10).  In what follows I 
examine how Meillassoux’s conception of correlationism in After Finitude, as I understand it, relates 
firstly to Kant’s transcendental idealist philosophy, and secondly to the analytic Kantianism of 
Wilfrid Sellars. I argue that central to the views of both Kant and Sellars is what might be called, 
with an ambivalent nod to Meillassoux, an objective correlationism.  What emerges in the end as the 
recommended upshot of these analyses is a naturalistic Kantianism that takes the form of an 
empirical realism in roughly Kant’s sense, but one that is happily wed with Sellars’ scientific 
realism, once the latter is disentangled from two implausible commitments that made such a 
reconciliation seem impossible to Sellars himself. 
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2. I want to begin by asking whether Kant’s empirical realism should be taken to be a 
“correlationist” view in Meillassoux’s sense?  The empirically real objects of possible experience, 
on Kant’s view, are (in the case of “outer sense”) causally interacting material objects that persist 
independently of our perspectival encounters with them.  But of course Kant’s empirical realism 
is inseparable from his “transcendental idealism”: such objects are necessarily the objects of certain 
a priori forms of sensible and conceptual representation, namely, space and time and the categories 
respectively.  Meillassoux’s conception of “transcendental correlationism” is clearly intended to 
include this primary sense in which the empirically real, mind-independent material objects of 
possible experience, for Kant, are “always already correlated with” or correlative to certain a priori 
forms of representation “in us,” as Kant is wont to put it.  While this certainly seems appropriate 
in general, everything hangs on just how one understands these elusive but fundamental Kantian 
conceptions, and in particular what sort of mind-dependence of the objects of experience or 
“phenomena” is thought to be entailed by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. 
 
 At the outset of After Finitude Meillassoux presents these issues vividly in terms of what he 
calls “ancestral” realities, an example of which would be what he dubs an “arche-fossil”:  “I will 
call ‘ancestral’ any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species,” and an arche-fossil or 
“fossil-matter” are materials such as the radioactive decay of isotypes that indicate the existence 
of an ancestral reality or event (Meillassoux 2008: 10).  In relation to correlationism, Meillassoux 
then formulates the philosophical “problem of ancestrality” in terms of the question, “how are we 
to conceive of the empirical sciences’ capacity to yield knowledge of the ancestral realm?”, and thus in terms of 
“the nature of scientific discourse”: 
 
how is mathematical discourse able to describe a world where humanity is absent; a world 
crammed with things and events that are not the correlates of any manifestation; a world 
that is not the correlate of a relation to the world?  This is the enigma .... (Meillassoux 2008: 
26) 
 
Meillassoux proceeds to argue that the very formulation of this question, “what is the condition 
that legitimates science’s ancestral statements?” has as “its primary condition ... the relinquishing 
of transcendentalism” (ibid. 27).  Given that I will follow Meillassoux in rejecting “speculative” 
versions of correlationism, and will agree that, as I shall consider it, “correlationism is not a 
metaphysics: it does not hypostatize the correlation” in terms of any “ancestral Witness” taken to 
ground the ancestral (e.g., God, Absolute Mind, the Kantian Ego incorrectly interpreted, et al.), 
our primary concern becomes whether Meillassoux is right that the problem of the ancestral entails 
the rejection of transcendental correlationism of the Kantian varieties, however sophisticated (cf. 
the two transcendental “correlationist rejoinders” that Meillassoux considers and rejects at 2008: 
18–26). 
 
 
3.  The first transcendentalist rejoinder that Meillassoux considers involves the familiar 
attempt to account for the existence of unperceived or unwitnessed ancestral events by introducing 
“a counterfactual such as the following: had there been a witness, then this occurrence would have 
been perceived in such and such a fashion” (2008: 19).  In apparent support of this interpretive 
move Meillassoux might well have quoted Kant’s example in the Critique of Pure Reason about the 
existence of unwitnessed inhabitants of the moon that we could experience: 
 
Accordingly, the objects of experience are never given [as things] in themselves, but only 
in experience, and they do not exist at all outside it. That there could be inhabitants of the 
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moon, even though no human being has ever perceived them, must of course be admitted; 
but this means only that in the possible progress of experience we could encounter them; 
for everything is actual that stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the 
laws of the empirical progression. Thus they are real when they stand in an empirical 
connection with my real consciousness, although they are not therefore real [as things] in 
themselves, i.e., outside this progress of experience. (A492–3/B521; interpolations added)1 
 
Meillassoux’s reply to this first transcendentalist rejoinder, however, indicates that he is 
understanding Kant’s empirical realism and transcendental idealism in ways that I think we ought 
to reject (cf. O’Shea 2012, 2016). 
 
 Meillassoux reconstructs the transcendentalist rejoinder as making the phenomenological 
point that what is already actually given in experience is always given against the background of 
aspects or regions that are not entirely given all at once in the experience, but which can or could 
be given by “adumbrations” (Husserl’s Abschattung) from what is actually given in the experience.  
On behalf of the rejoinder Meillassoux cites, for example, the existence of the unperceived 
backside of a perceived cube (2008: 19).  Meillassoux responds, however, that this trivial account 
of the existence of unperceived objects or events in terms of our capacity to fill in further 
unwitnessed “lacunae” as implicitly present in what is already actually given (cf. 2008: 20, on the 
idea of “a lacunary givenness”) – this correlationist construction of mere unwitnessed lacunae in 
“an event occurring when there is already givenness” – does not touch the deeper problem of the 
ancestral, which “designates an event ... anterior to givenness itself,” and which thus refers to 
“occurrences which are not contemporaneous with any givenness, whether lacunary or not” (ibid.): 
 
More acutely, the problem consists in understanding how science is able to think – without 
any particular difficulty – the coming into being of consciousness and its spatio-temporal 
forms of givenness in the midst of a space and time which are supposed to pre-exist the 
latter. ...[S]cience thinks a time in which the passage from the non-being of givenness to 
its being has effectively occurred – hence a time which, by definition, cannot be reduced to any 
givenness which preceded it and whose emergence it allows. (Meillassoux 2008: 21) 
 
Once we properly recognize that what is “at issue here is not the time of consciousness but the 
time of science” (ibid.), then according to Meillassoux we can see that “every variety of 
correlationism” is exposed as an extreme idealism” (2008: 18), whether Berkeley’s or Kant’s, by 
the problem of ancestral realities that exist prior to “the coming into being of consciousness and 
its spatio-temporal forms of givenness” (2008: 21). 
 
 It should be clear from these passages, however, that at least as far as his response to this 
first rejoinder is concerned (and we shall see that the second rejoinder does not alter the essential 
issues at stake), Meillassoux understands the correlationism involved in Kant’s empirical realism 
cum transcendental idealism in a way that restricts its claims to the domain of lacunae-filling 
constructions from some real historical or hypothetically imagined witnessings involved in some 
actually given conscious experience.  Then it will of course be impossible to make sense, for 
example, of Kant’s own pre-Critical nebular hypothesis concerning the origin of our solar system 
within a single spatiotemporal-causal material framework that pre-existed the emergence of any 
human consciousness.  But even internal to the first Critique this is not, in my view, the correct 
way to understand Kant’s “formal idealism,” as he also calls it (B518–519n).   
 
1 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, will be to the standard ‘A’ and ‘B’ paginations of the first 
(1781) and second (1787) editions respectively, using the translation by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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 Kant argues that any finite, temporally discursive cognition of a world requires or (as we 
might put it in this context) “correlates” objectively with certain a priori forms of conceptual and 
sensory representation in general.  As such Kant’s empirical realism is not based on gap-filling 
constructions from some actually given experiences, whether real or imagined, contra Meillassoux.  
Meillassoux takes it to be an anti-Kantian point to suggest that, as science indicates, “givenness 
could just as well never have emerged if life had not arisen” (2008: 22).  But Kant’s transcendental 
deduction, for example, concerns the lawful and structural forms, described functionally at the 
most abstract, second-order level, that must be true of any objective world that is to be the object 
of experience for any sensibly receptive yet potentially self-aware experiencer of that world; and 
these categorial forms of unity are then argued to be applicable, a fortiori, to our human 
spatiotemporal form of experience in particular.  Kant does not start with particular, partial sensory 
experiences and then seek to account for our construction of a world of objects to fill the lacunae 
in those states of consciousness (whether real or hypothetical).  Rather, he argues that the concept 
of any finite subject’s being aware of a plurality of sensible states at all in the first place, and in 
particular being aware of it as such a plurality, entails that such a subject’s world is already validly 
conceived by that subject as a directly perceived, empirically mind-independent, objective world 
of persisting physical realities in general, all of which, whether scientifically conceived or otherwise, 
must exist within a single, potentially infinitely extensive and divisible spatiotemporal universe.  As 
I will put it, Kant’s correlationism is an objective correlationism in this highly abstract and formal sense, 
a sense which contrasts sharply with the historically conditioned and restricted subjective 
correlationism that one finds in Meillassoux’s descriptions of transcendental correlationism in the 
passages examined above. 
 
 
4. This point can be further clarified and in fact reinforced by considering Meillassoux’s 
formulation of and response to the “second correlationist rejoinder from a transcendental 
perspective.”  This second Kantian rejoinder claims that Meillassoux’s arguments concerning 
ancestral realities involve “an elementary confusion between the empirical and the transcendental 
levels of the problem under consideration” (2008: 22).  But as with the first rejoinder, everything 
depends on how these distinctions are spelled out – in this case, the transcendental/empirical 
distinction.  Meillassoux portrays the Kantian as responding this way:  
 
You [Meillassoux] proceed as though the transcendental subject – which is ultimately the 
subject of science – was of the same nature as the physical organ which supports it – you 
collapse the distinction between the conscious organ which arose within nature and the 
subject of science which constructs the knowledge of nature.  But the difference between 
these two is that the conscious organ exists; it is an entity in the same sense as any other 
physical organ; whereas the transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to 
say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific 
knowledge of entities possible.  But a condition for objective cognition cannot be treated 
as an object, and since only objects can be said to exist, it is necessary to insist that a 
condition does not exist – precisely because it conditions. (Meillassoux 2008: 22–23). 
 
In response to the Kantian’s “play[ing] with the notion of condition in this way,” Meillassoux 
argues that despite the above distinction between objects, which exist, and a transcendental 
condition, which (Meillassoux’s Kantian says) “simply does not exist,” in the end “one still has to 
say that there is a transcendental subject, rather than no subject,” and “that such a subject takes 
place” (Meillassoux 2008: 24).  While following Kant in avoiding all speculative dogmatism, we 
must still grant that such a transcendental subject “takes place” in the sense of being “posited as a 
point of view on the world, and hence as taking place at the heart of the world,” as a “position in the 
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world” (ibid. 24–25).  Hence, as necessarily “localized among the finite objects” in this way, the 
transcendental subject “remains indissociable from its incarnation in a body” (ibid.); and therefore all of 
Meillassoux’s earlier objections to Kantianism based on ancestral realities that exist entirely 
independently of the emergence of any such perspectival givenness remain sound, he contends. 
 
 It is crucial to see exactly why and how Meillassoux’s understanding of these central 
Kantian distinctions is mistaken, in my view.  Meillassoux is certainly right about this important 
point: “Granted, the transcendental is the condition for knowledge of bodies, but it is necessary 
to add that the body is also the condition for the taking place of the transcendental” (2008: 25).  
But his argument involves the following fallacious inference:  (i) [This is true:] Kant’s 
transcendental subject requires a perspectival, spatiotemporal embodiment, as “a necessary 
condition”; therefore (ii) [This is false:] Kant’s  “correlationist” arguments concerning the 
necessary forms of any potentially self-conscious, finite cognition, are arguments that depend 
essentially on premises concerning (or concepts pertaining to) the emergence – the “instantiation” 
or “appearance” in space and time – of such embodied subjects; for example, on facts such as “the 
emergence of living bodies; that is to say, the emergence of the conditions for the taking place of the 
transcendental” (2008: 25).  The subtle mistake that I think is involved here can perhaps be brought 
out as follows. 
 
 Kant’s formal, transcendental method – his “objective correlationism,” as I have called it 
– involves a series of attempts to demonstrate that there are various nested necessary connections 
between concepts considered at various levels of abstraction from our fully embodied, 
spatiotemporal, empirically rich and historical experience.  For example, consider the progression 
of arguments across the two halves of the second edition Transcendental Deduction (the first half 
abstracting from our human, spatiotemporal form of sensibility, the second half reintroducing it); 
through the Schematism, the Analogies, and the Refutation of Idealism, to the empirically 
regulative yet nonetheless a priori transcendental principles of reason (in the Appendix to the 
Dialectic) and of reflective judgment (in the third Critique, etc.), and including the highest-level but 
material instantiations of the Analogies and other transcendental principles in Kant’s Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (matter-as-the-movable-in-space-subject-to-attractive-and-
repulsive-forces), and so on.  Each of the later stages of argument involves further, more specific, 
and eventually (indeterminately specified) empirical (including bodily) necessary conditions for the 
satisfaction of the earlier, more abstract demonstrated connections to be possible.   
 
 For instance, the Deduction’s attempted necessary conceptual connection between the 
possibility of the ‘I think’ being able to accompany all of my representations, and those 
representations being of an object that exists independently of my representings, is an argument that 
does not depend on, for instance, the further argumentation in the Refutation and then the 
regulative maxims and beyond concerning various additional necessary conditions on such a 
potentially self-aware experience, each necessary for the preceding: for example, that such a 
cognition must be of independent objects in time; in fact, in a determinate time-order; that it be of 
objects that are also in space; in fact, that it be of spatial objects that are directly (rather than indirectly) 
perceived as such (the Refutation); that it be of empirical objects that instantiate attractive and repulsive forces 
(the Metaphysical Foundations), and which are to some (a priori unspecifiable) degree empirically systematic 
as to their empirical kinds and empirical causal laws (the regulative maxims), which are necessary if there 
are to be any causal connections and hence any universal principle whatsoever, which is itself 
necessary if there is to be any ‘I think’ in the first place.  The same progression from the most 
abstract conceptual connections to successively more specific (and eventually, though 
indeterminately so) embodied, historical, and empirical necessary conditions, is observable in 
Kant’s practical philosophy, too, and is the key to understanding it as something other than an 
empty, abstract formalism: from the Groundwork and the second Critique through to the later, more 
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specific Metaphysics of Morals (the doctrines of justice and virtue), and including the regulative 
maxims and ideas of reason that are involved in Kant’s principles concerning politics and history.   
 
 The deep mistake is to hold that the highly abstract conceptual connections that are 
demonstrated at one level (say, in the Transcendental Deduction) depend on particular 
instantiatiations of the necessary (and eventually, empirical) conditions that are demonstrated also 
to be necessary with the assumption of further, more specific conditions (such as motion, etc.).  
Kant’s objective correlationism in my view plausibly seeks to demonstrate, for example, that any 
finite, sensibly receptive yet self-aware cognition must be directly of a world of objects in general 
conceived to persist independently of those perceptions.  The soundness of that argument does 
not depend on the sorts of bodily “taking place” that, with further assumptions and argumentation, 
Kant also contends are necessary conditions for that kind of cognition to be possible for beings 
like us.  And even in the latter case, i.e. in the case of the more specific necessary conditions, the 
objectively correlationist transcendental principles do not depend for their validity on the 
particular de re instantiation of those principles, in whatever specific manner they are or may be 
instantiated.  Furthermore, nothing in Kant’s method requires holding that such a priori 
transcendental conditions “do not exist,” as we saw Meillassoux put it on behalf of the Kantian.  
The argument, rather, is that if any such finite (etc.) knower exists, then the series of more and less 
abstract nested necessary conditions  must be satisfied, though in a manner that, at the empirical 
level, is not determinately specifiable merely a priori, but only indeterminately according to 
regulative maxims of reason or reflective judgment.  Nor does this method of transcendental 
abstraction from the empirical involve an unwitting metaphysical reification of the relevant non-
empirical conceptual connections in such a way as “to eternalize the correlation” (2008: 122).2  
Ancestral realities and the “paradox of the arche-fossil” (2008: 26) do not in the end undermine 
Kant’s objective transcendental (or formal) correlationism so understood,3 though the objection 
does require that Kant’s formal idealism and his transcendental/empirical and 
regulative/constitutive distinctions be understood as above – which fortunately, I believe, is the 
right way to understand them. 
 
  
5. Although I will not explore the matter in detail here, I believe that the above considerations 
can also help to clarify the equally interesting and complex issues raised by Meillassoux in Chapter 
4 of After Finitude, entitled “Hume’s Problem.”  Meillassoux seeks to defend a “speculative 
materialism” (2008: 121) that, among other things, pushes further than Hume himself Hume’s 
famous sceptical argument concerning our alleged “capacity to demonstrate the necessity of the 
causal connection,” that is “to demonstrate that the same effects will follow from the same causes 
 
2 For a treatment of Kant’s transcendental conception of self, concept, and object in relation to these topics 
that is, in my view, more insightful than Meillassoux’s, but which is also deeply informed by the latter’s 
work, see Brassier 2008 and 2011. More generally, Brassier’s continuing work on Sellars’ philosophy, 
including his contribution to this volume, has seen him depart from central aspects of Meillassoux’s work 
and move more in the direction of Sellars’ scientific realism, in ways that also highlight aspects of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy that are preserved, albeit in transformed shape, in Sellars’ scientific naturalism.  
See also recent work by Fabio Gironi (most recently, Gironi 2017, and this volume) for further constructive 
attempts to trace a path bridging recent developments in continental realism and analytic Kantianism, with 
a focus on the key role of Sellars.  Hariri’s contribution to this volume is another instance of a similarly 
constructive bridging of these traditions. 
 
3 Ray Brassier’s 2007 book, Nihil Unbound is well worth exploring by anyone interested in Meillassoux’s 
arguments in After Finitude and their wider intellectual setting, though his treatments there should be seen 
in the light of Brassier’s more recent work mentioned in the previous note. 
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ceteris paribus” (2008: 85; cf. 90 for the respect in which Meillassoux goes further than Hume).  
Meillassoux takes Kant’s transcendental correlationist response to Hume to lie in his attempt to 
show that “causal necessity is a necessary condition for the existence of consciousness and the 
world it experiences,” for the reason that the assumption of a chaotic or contingent world without 
the necessity of physical laws would render impossible any conscious representation of a world at 
all.  So that “if consciousness exists,” then “the hypothesis of the contingency of the laws of nature 
[is] refuted by the mere fact of representation,” according to Meillassoux’s Kant, and we can 
conclude that “there is a causality that necessarily governs phenomena” (Meillassoux 2008: 89). 
Against this Meillassoux attempts to expose “a logical fallacy inherent in the transcendental 
deduction” by showing, “contrary to what the latter maintains, that the constancy of the 
phenomenal world does not amount to a refutation of the contingency [or non-necessity] of 
physical laws” (2008: 93).  Rather, Meillassoux goes on to argue, it is possible to account for such 
phenomenal constancy and the stability of its empirical laws in terms of “the purely intelligible 
chaos that underlies every aspect of it” (ibid. 83). 
 
 Meillassoux develops this wider argument in considerable detail, raising many important 
issues, but for present purposes I will continue to focus specifically on certain aspects of his 
critique of Kant’s correlationist response to “Hume’s Problem.”  We should, I believe, distinguish 
three different aspects of Kant’s views on causal necessity (cf. O’Shea 1997, and 2012: Ch. 5):   
 
(1) First, there is the transcendental necessity – an “objectively correlational” conceptual 
necessity, as we described it earlier with an ambivalent nod to Meillassoux – of the Second 
Analogy’s general causal principle.  This principle holds that, necessarily (= 
transcendental), for any given alteration (call it B), there exists some prior alteration or other 
(call it X), such that alterations of X’s type produce (i.e., causally, physically necessitate) 
alterations of B’s type.  
  
(2) Second, there will be whatever particular empirical causal law is discovered or 
hypothesized to fulfil that transcendental-correlational requirement in any particular case: 
for example, we might hypothesize that it is A-type events (say, the heat of the sun) that 
produce B-type events (the melting of wax; cf. A764–6/B792–4).  
 
(3) Third, using Kant’s terms, there is the “problematic,” and traditionally “dogmatic” 
principle of reason, which demands that there be some logically sufficient reason or 
condition or explanation for any given conditioned empirical reality such that the totality 
of empirical conditions ultimately is thought, by a “transcendental illusion,” to require for 
its logically sufficient explanation either an “unconditioned condition” (for example, God), 
or a knowably complete totality of conditions (A305–9/B362–6; A783–4/B811–12).   
 
 
 Kant’s conclusion in the Dialectic, including its crucial Appendix on the regulative maxims 
and ideas of reason, is that the traditional principle of sufficient reason must be understood critically 
as limited (in this case) to the Second Analogy’s principle (1) above, as formally constitutive of the 
possibility experience in general.  However, (1) in turn entails (2): that is, that there must exist some 
empirical causal laws or other to be discovered (this is necessary for the possibility of satisfying the 
transcendental principle in (1)).  And furthermore, while (3)’s principle of sufficient reason is 
demonstrably illusory when considered “dogmatically” as a constitutive principle, Kant argues that 
the possibility of fulfilling (2)’s requirement in turn (and hence satisfying (1)) does require an 
indeterminately regulative use of reason according to the maxims of which there must exist, in any 
knowable nature, some degree and manner or other of empirical uniformity and systematicity.  The latter 
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empirical lawfulness, however, has to be discovered empirically as far as both its nature and its 
degree of empirical uniformity or systematicity are concerned.   
 
 If one reads Meillassoux’s critique of Kant on “the necessity of physical laws” in his 
chapter on “Hume’s Problem” with Kant’s three carefully distinguished aspects of necessity  in 
mind, and with the resulting interrelated transcendental/empirical and 
dogmatic/regulative/constitutive distinctions clearly in view, I think his striking critique of Kant’s 
formal correlationism becomes highly ambiguous and problematic.  It should be kept in mind, for 
example, that for Kant all of the particular physical laws discovered in the natural sciences are 
contingent and defeasible rather than necessary.4  Of course, each empirical causal law involves 
physical necessitation as per (2) above – i.e., given that empirical kind of alteration A occurs, then 
kind B necessarily follows – that is, if we’ve got the right empirical causal law to cover the empirical 
case at hand, which is a contingent matter of ongoing inquiry.  That is one kind of relative necessity, 
along with one kind of empirical contingency, that is involved in Kant’s conception of physical 
laws.  Another (conceptually) relative necessity pertains to (1), i.e. Kant’s formal, objective 
correlationism proper: that is, if any experience of a world is to be possible for any finite (etc.) 
knower at all, then principle (1) must obtain in that world, and (1) requires that (2) is empirically 
realized in some way or other (to be discovered); while (2) in turn requires the a priori 
indeterminate but nonetheless transcendentally necessary regulative assumptions articulated by the 
“maxims” of reason and (in the third Critique) reflective judgment that are involved in (3).  But what 
kind and what degree of “stable” uniformity and empirical systematicity the world actually possesses is for Kant 
not something that can be legislated by us a priori, but rather is to be discovered through ongoing 
inquiry into nature’s secrets. 
 
 It is importantly true, as Kant argues in relation to (3) in the first Critique’s Appendix to the 
Dialectic, that the chaotic supposition of no degree of empirical uniformity at all (hypothetically assuming 
that this made sense) would render the application of any general concepts impossible (2), and 
hence would render the instantiation of (1)’s properly correlationist principle impossible as well 
(cf. A653–4/B681–2).  But for Kant, that a priori regulative requirement of reason, i.e. that there 
exist in any knowable nature in general some degree of empirical uniformity and systematicity or 
other (i.e., (3)), is consistent with the discovery of all manner of relative stability and instability in 
nature’s actual empirical laws, our conceptions of which of course change as a result of inquiry, 
on Kant’s view.  Any attempt to prove a priori – as Meillassoux suggests is in fact the case in 
relation to the supposed implicit reasoning that he thinks lies behind Kant’s alleged “necessitarian 
inference” (cf. 2008: 93–98) – that phenomenal nature’s physical laws must have a deeper necessity 
or non-contingency, one that is putatively derivable by reason from a consideration of “all those 
possibilities that are conceivable (non-contradictory)” in relation to “all those possibilities that are 
actually experienced” (2008: 95), would manifestly be regarded by Kant as a dogmatic use of reason.  
Such a use would violate the strictures on reason involved in (3), as well as being motivated largely 
by underplaying or missing out the contingency that is already involved in both (2) and (3), for 
Kant, not to mention the merely relative formal necessity that is involved in (1) (as discussed in 
relation to the “first rejoinder” in the previous section above).   
 
 All of the above points should make it clear why I think we should not be happy with 
Meillassoux’s portrayal of what is involved, or what is implicit, in Kant’s formal correlationist 
 
4 Of course there is an important dimension of relative a priori derivability involved in Kant’s metaphysics 
of natural science, particularly in relation to Newton’s discovered laws: see Friedman 1992 and his later 
writings for a start on this complex topic; and cf. O’Shea 1997 (and work currently in progress) for my take 
on the aspects of a priori derivability and empirical inquiry that I take to be involved in Kant’s philosophy 
of nature as a whole. 
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response to Hume’s Problem.  This can be illustrated by the following passage, for example (but 
see also 2008: 105–8 for confusions, from my perspective, resulting from not distinguishing or 
from misconceiving Kant’s (1), (2), and (3) above): 
 
To sum up: the Humean-Kantian inference is an instance of probabilistic reasoning5 
applied not to an event in our universe, but rather to our universe itself considered as 
merely one among a totality of possible universes. ... [I]f physical laws could actually change 
for no reason, it would be extraordinarily improbable if they did not change ... so frequently 
... that we would never have been here to notice it in the first place, since the ensuing chaos 
would have precluded the minimal degree of order and continuity required for the 
correlation between consciousness and world. Thus, necessity is proven by a fact of 
immensely improbable stability, viz., the permanence of the laws of nature, and by the 
subjective obverse of this permanence, which is the consciousness of a subject capable of 
science. Such is the logic of the necessitarian argument, and more particularly, of the 
frequentialist implication that underlies it. (Meillassoux 2008: 98) 
 
For as we have seen, for Kant the “minimal degree of order and continuity” required to satisfy (2) 
and thereby (1) is only indeterminately specified  as to its nature and degree by reason’s regulative 
maxims (i.e., in (3)), and is in no way further specifiable merely a priori.  The argument put forward 
in the passage above involves what Kant would regard as a “dogmatic” use of reason.  Further, 
the actual physical laws of nature, whatever they turn out to be, are contingent relative to the a 
priori “correlational” necessity in (1), which is itself a relative formal necessity rather than a claim 
involving its own “taking place”.  Again, the so-called “permanence” of the laws of nature referred 
to in the passage is merely formal if it pertains to (1), and false when considered in relation to the 
empirical dimensions in (2) and (3) if this “permanence” is taken to imply (as seems to be the case 
in Meillassoux’s argument)  that Kant insists on the non-contingency of the actual “manifest” 
physical laws of phenomenal nature.  To the contrary, on Kant’s view the particular empirical 
physical laws that turn out to satisfy  the transcendental principle in (1) are contingent in that 
respect, as explained above; and it is a mistake to think that Kant has in mind, whether implicitly 
or not, the overreaching dogmatic if “natural” yearning of reason to demonstrate “why it is these 
laws, rather than others, which necessarily exist” (Meillassoux 2008: 107). 
 
 
6. For the above reasons I take Kant’s formal-objective correlationism not to be undermined 
by Meillassoux’s critique, whatever other problems Kant’s transcendental idealism might face.  But 
I  have implicitly been agreeing that Kant’s empirical realism cum transcendental idealism can in 
some sense be understood as “correlationist,” i.e. when this is properly understood as an objective 
and formal correlationism in the ways that I have been outlining, and when it is thus seen to be 
related to the properly empirical level and to contingency in very different ways than Meillassoux’s 
pictures of Kant suggest.  Hereafter let “correlationism” refer to any objective Kantian empirical 
realism understood as I have delineated it here.  What then?  What sort of realism is a correlational 
“empirical realism” so understood?  Is it in conflict, for example, with scientific realism, and in 
particular with the strong variety of scientific realism defended by Sellars?   
 
 It might well seem to be.  After all, as everyone knows, Sellars consciously appropriated 
Kant’s transcendental idealism in order to articulate his distinction between the ontology of the 
“appearances” in the “manifest image,” which stands in ostensible but resolvable conflict with the 
 
5 For a brief summary of Meillassoux’s argument against the “frequentialist implication” concerning the set 
of thinkable possibilities as a whole, which he takes to underlie Kant’s “necessitarian inference,” see Gratton 
and Ennis 2015: 169–70. 
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successor or replacement ontology of the “scientific image,” which according to Sellars gradually 
reveals to us the real nature of “things in themselves” (Sellars 1962 and 1968, passim).  Furthermore, 
in After Finitude, Meillassoux’s own argument leads the reader through and beyond his extended 
critique of Kantian correlationism to the radically non-correlationist, Cartesian rationalist scientific 
realism of his own speculative materialism, which for him is based  on an “intellectual intuition” 
grounded in pure mathematics.  I will not pursue Meillassoux’s own positive program here, since 
the speculative turn as developed by Meillassoux himself is arguably “dogmatic” in Kant’s sense 
(at least on my reading of the significance of Kant’s work) and is thus epistemically suspect from 
the perspective of any defender of an objective correlationism.6  In what remains I will briefly 
suggest, however, that Sellars was both a Kantian objective correlationist to the end and a 
thoroughgoing scientific realist, though in my view the most fruitful development of this outlook 
requires rejecting certain aspects of Sellars’ own view.   
 
 
7. Elsewhere I have argued that, all things considered, Sellars’ philosophy is most accurately 
interpreted as a Kantian naturalism that attempts to combine two prima facie conflicting lines of 
thought into one conceptually coherent outlook on reality.7  One is Sellars’ commitment to an all-
comprehensive scientific naturalism, to be discussed further below.  The other is the Kantian 
objective-correlationist idea (to continue using Meillassoux’s term, but as understood above), 
expressed in writings by Sellars throughout his career, that there are certain holistic, second-order 
meta-principles or categorial conditions that philosophical analysis can show must be true of any 
empirically significant language or conceptual framework that is to succeed in being about the world 
in which it used.  To mention one among many other examples – here in relation to his 
interpretation of Kant’s views – Sellars describes an updated Kantian “transcendental linguistics” 
as attempting “to delineate the general features that would be common to the epistemic 
functioning of any language in any possible world,” parallel to the way in which Kant’s 
 
6 Since “correlationism” is used in multiple different ways, I hesitate to call myself or to call Sellars (or even 
Kant himself) a “defender of correlationism” – but here I am doing so in the case of both Kant and Sellars, 
if Kant’s correlationism is understood as I have described it in the preceding sections. Given how I am 
understanding the term, there might not be any real disagreement on this particular matter between my 
view and certain others in this volume, such as Westphal or Christias, given the aspects of “correlationism” 
that they are criticizing for the purposes of their arguments.  Westphal, for example (and cf. Westphal 
2004), generally agrees with the sorts of Kantian transcendental arguments that I have been appealing to 
here, which he sees as consistent with the rejection of Kant’s own transcendental idealism (on Westphal’s 
reading of that position) and thus also as consistent with a pragmatic and scientific realism. The Kantian 
naturalist version of empirical realism that will emerge from my discussion of Kant and Sellars here, I take 
it, is not far off Westphal’s realism in the end, though in the way I have framed matters I remain, as I think 
Sellars does, too, a “formal, objective correlationist” in Kant’s sense. 
 Similarly, I find myself largely in agreement with Dionysis Christias’s work on Sellars and 
Meillassoux (in this volume, and cf. Christias 2016), although for his purposes he, like most others in this 
volume, quite reasonably frames his argument in such a way that Sellars, but not Meillassoux himself, 
succeeds in overcoming correlationism (i.e., subjective correlationism, as distinguished earlier).  Similarly in 
relation to Sachs 2016 and in this volume, I find myself for the most part agreeing regarding the complex 
relationships between the normative and the non-normative dimensions of experience in Sellars’ work. 
 
7 Here I will briefly lay out the relevant views of Sellars bluntly and summarily, having provided the detailed 
textual and interpretive support elsewhere, for example, in O’Shea 2007, 2011, 2016.  Sellars’ primary 
appropriations of Kant are to be found in his 1968 and in the writings collected in Sellars 2002, as well as 
many other papers during the last two decades of his life. My present purpose, however, is to reflect on the 
connections between Sellars’ Kantian correlationism and his scientific realism in general, as a contrast to 
Meillassoux’s outlook as discussed above. 
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transcendental philosophy sought to establish “the general features any conceptual system must 
have in order to generate knowledge of a world to which it belongs.”8  
 
 The relevant principles concern various norm-governed uniformities that reflect a given 
framework’s implicit, socially maintained linguistic “ought-to-be” rules.  These include, for 
example, conceptual-linguistic norms that instantiate general perceptual reliability principles: for 
example, that other things being equal, within any given framework, specific types of objects ought 
to elicit specific types of conceptual/linguistic responses in “normal” circumstances.  Or again, 
Sellars argues, any language that can serve as a cognitive instrument and succeed in representing a 
world will include instantiations of causal principles that ceteris paribus warrant material-inferential 
connections between different assertions embodying different empirical contents. Of course, the 
particular material-inference principles are always defeasible for Sellars (as in fact for Kant, too, 
but more radically so for Sellars), but the transcendental or correlational requirement that, for any 
framework, there must be such material-inferential warrants, if any empirical knowledge is to be 
possible at all, is as true for Sellars as it was for Kant.  Finally, at the highest, i.e. most abstractly 
formulated level, for Sellars following Kant, such principles reflect various formal-correlational 
truths concerning a conceptually necessary interdependence between the possibility of any 
potentially self-aware cognitions at all, and the objective validity of the above sorts of meta-
principles in general (cf. Sellars 2002: Chapters 3 and 5). On this view radical scepticism was held 
by Sellars from his earliest studies at Oxford to the end of his career to be a non-starter that is 
based from the start on a mistaken conceptual analysis of the form of our experience in general 
(cf. O’Shea 2016: 3–6).  In sum: 
 
Thus, if logical and (more broadly) epistemic categories express general features of the 
ought-to-bes (and corresponding uniformities) which are necessary to the functioning of 
language as a cognitive instrument, epistemology, in this context, becomes the theory of 
this functioning – in short transcendental linguistics. (Sellars 2002: 302, §40) 
 
 My view is that Sellars was committed to the above sorts of Kantian formal-objective 
correlationist principles not only in relation to his conception of the “manifest image,” which as 
we know he frames as a Kantian world of “appearances” that is ultimately, at least with regard to 
its object ontology (if not, in crucial respects, with regard to its defensible Kantian view of persons, 
norms, and meanings: cf. O’Shea 2016: 134–7), to be successively reconceived and replaced by the 
explanatorily superior object-ontology of self-correcting scientific inquiry, which reveals the true 
nature of things in themselves (and thus also the true nature of the “appearances” of the 
predecessor frameworks, including the objects of the “common sense framework” or manifest 
image). Sellars regards such Kantian principles as necessarily characterizing any materially 
contentful conceptual framework that succeeds in representing a mind-independent material world 
at all, including those frameworks generated by scientific theorizing.9 
 
8 Cf. Sellars 2002: 298, 302 [= KTE §§29, 40–1], as well as the further references to Sellars’ various 
statements endorsing this view of Kant’s across his career that I have documented in O’Shea 2007: 132–5; 
2011 passim; and 2016: 3–8, 134–146. 
 
9 For a criticism of my reading of Sellars as defending Kantian constitutive principles of knowledge and 
self-consciousness even with respect to the Peircean ideal image of persons-in-the-world, see Rottschaefer 
2011 (and cf. my response in O’Shea 2011).  I have no doubt been influenced in my reading of Sellars by 
the works of his student and my teacher, Jay F. Rosenberg.  See Rosenberg’s own Sellarsian defense of a 
Kantian “core realism” in One World and Our Knowledge of It (1980) and in The Thinking Self (1986), and how 
this generates an “empirical epistemics” in scientific theory-succession that I take to be governed by 
normative meta-principles of the sort I have been briefly describing above, though of course involving 
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 It might be thought that Sellars’ well-known conception of a non-normative, isomorphic 
picturing or correspondence relation that obtains between scientific-theoretical representings on the 
one hand and the “pure processes” that are thereby represented on the other, shows that the sorts 
of normative Kantian principles I have been referring to do not (or would not) characterize the 
ideal scientific image conception of the nature of things in the “Peircean long run,” according to 
Sellars.  But that reading would misunderstand the ways in which even the most groundlevel 
matter-of-factual representational or picturing relations in Sellars are constituted by “semantic 
uniformities” of response, inference, and action that are themselves generated, governed, 
maintained, and creatively revised by implicit as well as reflectively evaluated “semantic rules” or 
normative-linguistic ought-to-be’s (cf. Sellars 1968: chapters 3–5).  
  
 In fact, it is arguably the most distinctive claim of both philosophers (Kant on “blindness” 
of “intuitions without concepts,” and Sellars on “the myth of the given”) that the only ultimately 
coherent account of the crucial contributions of the nonconceptual or naturalistic dimensions of 
human cognition, whether in its sensory aspects or in the most speculative advances of 
mathematical physics, requires a revolutionary understanding of how conceptual norms and 
contents are already necessarily involved (of course defeasibly, at the empirical level) in determining 
the ways in which those nonconceptual aspects of our representings can succeed in representing 
any real object or process in the first place. Furthermore, such necessarily mutually conditioning 
interrelationships between the normative and natural, the conceptual and nonconceptual, meaning 
and ‘picturing’,  for Sellars, characterize any empirically significant conceptual framework, whether 
it be the manifest image or a given scientific-theoretical framework, and including our regulative 
conception of the Peircean ideal scientific image of the world. A proper understanding of Sellars’ 
account of conceptual change in the advancement of science itself relies upon the formal truth, at 
the meta-conceptual or “transcendental” level, of a Kantian, objectively realist correlationism of 
the sort sketched above (cf. O’Shea 2007: 147–63). 
 
 
8. But surely the picture of Kant and Sellars presented in this chapter must in some 
fundamental respect have misrepresented the views of one or the other thinker, or both, since the 
formal correlationism of Kant’s empirical realism is restricted to, and valid only for, the domain of 
“appearances” in space and time (the model for Sellars’ manifest image), and does not characterize 
our thought of “things as they are in themselves”; whereas I have presented Kant’s correlationist 
empirical realism as if it were, on Sellars’ view, constitutive of both the manifest and scientific 
images of “man-in-the-world” (Sellars 1962)?   
 
 With respect to Kant, it is true that I must place myself among those interpreters who, all 
things considered, see Kant as putting forward his empirical realism (and hence his correlative 
“formal idealism”) as, so to speak, real realism – that is, as the only intelligible realism, and the only 
intelligible “metaphysics,” of which sense can be made – rather than seeing the domain of 
appearances (the physical universe) as being, for Kant, a second-class domain that represents for 
us an inevitable barrier to our grasping the supposedly really real domain of so-called “things in 
themselves.”  I cannot, of course, enter that perennial interpretive debate about Kant here (cf. 
O’Shea 2012), and in the end that question is not crucial in relation to what I think is importantly 
true about Sellars’ Kantian naturalism.  For I think Sellars as sketched above basically has the right 
account of the nature of Kant’s formally correlationist empirical realism.  My concerns pertain rather 
 
sharp differences from Kant (and in the direction of Peirce) on the matter of critically controlled conceptual 
change in science (see below). 
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to Sellars’ own account of the object-ontology of “the common sense framework,” i.e. the manifest 
image conception of perceptible, colored physical objects, as being, in Sellars’ sense (but not Kant’s, 
I believe), “transcendentally ideal, i.e. that there really are no such things as the objects of which it speaks” 
(Sellars 1968: Chapter 5, §95; italics added).  I will close with a few remarks on what I mean by 
these last claims (cf. O’Shea 2016, Ch. 7). 
 
 
9. As just noted, Sellars’ own way of adapting Kant’s “transcendental idealist” thesis is to take 
it as asserting that the persisting, colored objects of the manifest image are intentional objects or 
“representables” that do not exist per se, as he puts it, though they have a represented lawful actuality 
and objectivity in Kant’s senses.  They are in the end for Sellars “mere appearances,” though Sellars 
argues that we can and should substitute for Kant’s basically theological conception of unknowable 
“things in themselves” the theoretical posits of the ongoing scientific image, in accordance with 
Sellars’ scientific realism and his account of conceptual change as noted earlier.  I have criticized 
in detail elsewhere key aspects of Sellars’ substitute for Kant’s transcendental idealism, including 
its key idea that scientific realism entails the falsity of the object-ontology of the manifest image, in 
the nuanced way that Sellars understands that radical claim (cf. O’Shea 2016, chapter 7). So here I 
will be brief by way of tying together the matters discussed in this chapter.10 
 
 In Science and Metaphysics (1968), chapter two, Sellars argued, inter alia, that Kant’s own 
arguments for transcendental idealism are unsound, and that the only successful argument for that 
thesis (again, interpreted by Sellars as asserting the ultimate falsity of the object-ontology of the 
manifest image) derives from Sellars’ own famous (or infamous?) views concerning the ultimately 
real ontological home of “expanses of colour” and other sensible qualities: namely, as analogically 
conceived “non-physical2” basic constituents of central nervous systems, to be discovered by a 
future neuroscientific theory of consciousness.11  To cut to the chase, there are two very different 
sorts of argument, in two different domains, that Sellars primarily relies upon to draw in this way 
his own radical (and non-Kantian) “transcendental idealist” conclusion.  I shall describe these 
regions of complex argument in Sellars crudely here, along with my reservations about them: 
 
(A)  The first cluster of arguments concern, for example, Sellars’ contention that the 
“ultimate homogeneity” of sensible (e.g., colour) qualities (allegedly) requires their 
wholesale ontological “relocation” (Rosenthal 2016) to the perceiver in such a way that 
ultimately entails the falsity of the manifest image’s ordinary object-ontology of persisting, 
coloured physical objects.  
 
But many philosophers, myself included, who are otherwise strongly influenced by Sellars’ 
philosophy would contend that in this particular region of his thought Sellars ultimately relies upon 
doubtful and widely contested assumptions about sensory consciousness, assumptions that have 
 
10 For an in depth and insightful treatment of these aspects of Sellars’ appropriation of Kant, see Haag 
2016. 
 
11 For a start, cf. Sellars 1956 part XVI, 1962 parts V–VI, 1968 chapters 1, 5, 6, for example.   For my 
analysis of Sellars’ views on “sensa,” cf. O’Shea 2007, chapter 6. For Sellars, something is physical1 if it 
belongs in the space-time-causal network (this is the wider, all-inclusive notion), and physical2 if it is definable 
in terms of theoretical primitives adequate to describe the universe prior to the appearance of life. So for 
Sellars, “sensa” such as expanses of colour, i.e. processes involving qualitative sensory consciousness in 
what corresponds, at the microlevel, to the central nervous system), are physical1-but-not-physical2. Put most 
starkly: the basic primitives of physics will in future have to be radically reconceived in order to handle 
qualitative sensory consciousness, on Sellars’ view. 
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been exposed as non-compulsory in debates in the philosophy of mind about “qualia” over the 
last several decades.12 
 
(B)  The second point concerns Sellars’ apparent assumption that the Feyerabend/Kuhn 
style ontological replacement models of scientific development in theoretical physics that 
Sellars developed independently in his own account of radical conceptual change and 
scientific explanation, will neatly generalize to all the so-called “special sciences” such as 
biology as well, thus giving him confidence that all the objects of the manifest image and 
of the special sciences will, in principle, be reducible to successor-theory replacement 
ontologies in the way that is at least arguably suggested by Sellars’ various accounts of the 
kinetic theory of gases, of relativity theory in relation to Newtonian physics, and so on. 
 
But on what basis does Sellars thus assume that this sweeping generalization and projection about 
the future course of the natural sciences holds across all such object-domains, such that, in the 
end, only the objects or rather “absolute processes” of a future microphysics really exist in the end?  
Here too debates over the last several decades concerning the ontological status of the objects of 
the “special sciences” such as biology arguably suggest otherwise.   
 
 I do not intend to enter into the ongoing debates about (A) and (B) here.  I have mentioned 
these considerations only to motivate, however briefly, my own view that Sellars in the end offers 
no compelling reason to follow him in embracing the radical thesis thathe calls “transcendental 
idealism”: that is, the thesis that the ordinary objects of the manifest image strictly speaking do not 
exist per se, though of course on his view their scientific successors in a future ideal physics do 
really exist, as what correspond for Sellars to Kant’s theologically conceived “things in 
themselves.”  I think it is crucial to recognize, however, that as I argued earlier Sellars does embrace 
the objective, formal correlationism of Kant’s empirical realism throughout his thinking, across both 
the manifest and scientific images, as holding true of any empirically significant conceptual 
framework.  And in light of that fact, I suggest that once we have rejected (A) and (B) above it 
should strike us now that the following closely related positions, (A*) and (B*), reflect what are 
the really important insights of Sellars in these two domains, but now without Sellars’ arguably 
implausible version of “transcendental idealism”.  That is: 
 
(A*)  We can fully embrace Sellars’ ingenious mid-twentieth century attempt to make room 
for robust theories of nonconceptual sensory representation (against the apparent 
recommendations of such so-called “left wing” Sellarsian philosophers as Richard Rorty, 
Robert Brandom, and John McDowell) within what is nevertheless a robustly Kantian-
correlational empirically realist framework (of the sorts defended, for example, by 
Brandom and McDowell).  What we need to reject in this domain are only the two doubtful 
assumptions  referred to in (A) and (B).13 
 
(B*)  Fully consistently with Sellars’ objective Kantian correlationism – but rejecting the 
contentions in (A) – we can defend a robust and self-correcting scientific realist outlook on 
the reality of theoretical entities (as Kant himself arguably did, e.g., in the Appendix to the 
Dialectic), as involving radical conceptual change in whatever domains this turns out to be 
 
12  For a summary of these issues as pertains to Sellars and his Sellarsian critics, cf. O’Shea 2016.  For an in 
depth yet sympathetic criticism of this “relocation” aspect of Sellars’ view, see Rosenthal 2016 in particular. 
 
13 For progress on this front by Sellars-inspired philosophers, see for example Coates 2007; Landy 2015; 
Rosenberg 1986, chapters 4–6; Rosenthal 2016; Sachs 2014; and Westphal 2004.  For a detailed naturalistic 
defense of Sellars’ own views about sensory consciousness informed by recent scientific developments in 
dynamical systems theory, see Seibt 2016. 
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explanatorily successful a posteriori; but without this scientific realism allegedly entailing 
merely a priori or “transcendentally” the fully generalized ultimate falsity of “the common 
sense framework,” i.e., the basic manifest image object-ontology.  
 
The resulting Kantian naturalist outlook would be “objectively correlationist” throughout, and with 
Sellars we would hold that there is nothing about such a conceptually correlationist empirical realism 
that entails a subjectively correlationist version of transcendental idealism in the ways that I have 
argued pertain to Meillassoux’s interpretation of Kantian correlationism.  But against Sellars, we 
would be rejecting (A) and (B) in favor of pursuing the closely related but more plausible (A*) and 
(B*). 
 
 Overall, put polemically, if this Kantian naturalist empirical realism and scientific realism 
is charged with being a form of “anti-realism,” the response should be that it is only “anti-” the 
sorts of epistemically unhinged Realisms that flout the sorts of generically abstract, objectively 
correlationist conceptual conditions that continue to be fruitfully articulated in a wide variety of 
updated variations on Kantian themes, of which Sellars’ own Kantian naturalist philosophy 
continues to be one of the most compelling examples.   
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